The NPT RevCon in the Rearview Mirror

I attended two weeks of the quinquennial nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in May at the UN in New York. Here are my thoughts following the disastrous failure of the conference to achieve any substantive progress, which have been published by Reaching Critical Will in their final "News in Review" NPT newsletter:

Seeing the RevCon in the Rearview Mirror

The 2005 NPT Review Conference is history. Like the prostrate pedestrian victim of a hit-and-run Hummer accident, for those of us along for the ride, the conference is only dimly visible through the kicked-up dust in the rearview mirror. But what can be seen is not pretty.

At the end of the Cold War, many expert observers wondered what direction the global body politic would go without the East-West/Communist-Capitalist construct. Some saw great opportunity in the resulting freedom of movement that powerful countries could exert in such a world; others saw the danger of chaos. Now almost fifteen years later, we are beginning to learn that both of these aspects are true. A US-led coalition of the willing can invade and overthrow governments without fear from the Eastern Bloc; North Korea can withdraw from the NPT to pursue its nuclear programs with relatively little resultant pressure from the fractured
international framework.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the epitome of this post-Cold War dilemma and the current state of affairs demands answers to two questions: do we believe in the value of an international community and what value do we place on international law? If we value the first, then overarching issues that cross state boundaries demand attention beyond narrow and minimalist understandings. If we value the second at all, we will move to strengthen the international framework with a firm knowledge that in doing so, we not only benefit the larger community, but ourselves as well.

And so we come to the 2005 RevCon. The original text of the NPT has its shortcomings. But as a negotiated agreement between States, this is so nearly a truism as to be an empty assertion. Indeed, the very purpose of the review conferences is to monitor the operation of the treaty and suggest improvements as necessary. In that light, it is no surprise that an array of States have submitted over fifty working papers that offer improvements to the treaty in this year's conference. What is unconscionable is that no progress was made at all on any suggestion, due to the hijacking of the process by a very few States - two to be exact: the United States and Iran.

Both sides contort their arguments to make their case, relying on a narrow reading of the NPT. Iran asserts its right to civilian nuclear power- and by extension, a complete fuel cycle while denying that any intention exists to create a domestic nuclear weapon capability. The United States demands tighter controls and stricter enforcement of non-compliance, while claiming that it itself is in full compliance with Article VI.

Stephen Rademaker, the head of the US delegation, likes to say- and says often- that people should read the text of Article VI to see how little is obligated on disarmament, concluding that under any reading, the US is compliant. However, this is only potentially true under the strictest of readings. What it crucially ignores are past commitments given by the US, particularly during the RevCons of 1995 and 2000, that go well beyond the original Art. VI text, without which there would be no NPT today. These commitments are well known: ratification of CTBT, negotiations on FMCT, irreversibility of reductions, negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, etc.-yet the US has followed through on none of them and instead investigates new generations of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, Iran pins its claims to its nuclear program on an equally constrictive reading of Art. IV, asserting that as long as it is in compliance with its other NPT obligations (relevant here are Art. II and III) it has the right to pursue a civilian program however it sees fit, i.e., a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle. This is also not without problems. First, Iran has only in the kindest sense been cooperative with the IAEA, the body that monitors compliance, and has been found violating its obligations in the past, raising widespread suspicions that Iran is insincere in its stated intentions. Second, alternatives to a domestic fuel cycle exist and are embraced by many other Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Indeed, several suggestions for improving options for access to nuclear fuel by NNWS have been made over the last few months.

With this intransigence, inflexibility, and perhaps sleight-ofhand, two countries (and their proxies) hijacked the conference, preventing, for the first time ever, any of the three working parties to forward a substantive document to the chair. Inside the NPT, there will be no progress. Starkly, outside the NPT, events will unfold nevertheless. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty, with consequences yet to unfold. Iran and the EU-3 negotiate for a settlement. The Bush administration will pursue new nuclear weapons and construe its disarmament obligations as it sees fit. Three States-India, Pakistan, and Israel-remain outside the treaty. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and their materials around the globe remains the number one international security threat facing us all.

The end of the Cold War has brought the prospect of dramatically improved options and rights for many. But with rights come obligations. In the end, we must learn that overarching frameworks, both national and international, must circumscribe the enjoyed freedom of movement brought about by the end of the Cold War. The more we undermine these systems, we not only encourage others to do likewise, but perhaps more importantly, we hamper our abilities both to deal with problems when they arise and to encourage others to help us in our efforts. With the end of the 2005 RevCon, we have frittered away a valuable opportunity.

As we grow five years older in 2010, let's hope we grow a bit wiser, too.

Catching Crabs v. Missile Defense

Henny penny, the sky is falling!

Whether it's WMDs in Iraq or the threat from terrorist missiles, Don Rumsfeld and his doomsayer posse are sure at their best presenting grim faces and dire predictions--whether it's the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that necessitates preemptively invading a foreign country, or the threat of rogue nations developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that forces through a missile defense system hobbled by decades of technical problems and spiraling funding levels (So that's what "spiral development" means!).

But you know what? We've concluded there were no WMD in Iraq prior to the 2002 invasion.

We've found no evidence of a nuclear weapons development program in Iraq past 1992.

And as of today's news, we have reassessed our chemical weapons threat assessment of pre-invasion Iraq, admitting they had no chemical weapons program after 1991.

Should we be so surprised if we now find out that the missile threat isn't quite the bogeyman we've been told it is?

Today, it seems as though the Alaska cod and crab season are more pressing than developing missile defense. That's quite a change of heart from the President Bush who pledged to deploy missile defenses by the end of his first term (that's still as "Mission Accomplished" as Iraq is), in large part by gutting the testing program because the threat was so urgent we could brook no delay.

Now that's a whale of a fishing expedition.


Here's the story from the Feb. 1 edition of the Global Security Newswire:

U.S. Missile Defense Test Schedule to Work Around Alaska Cod, Crab Season,
Official Says

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s next target test launch from the Kodiak
Launch Complex in Alaska is expected to be scheduled around cod and tanner
crab fishing season, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan.
13).

Officials previously had said the next test would occur in mid-February, but
that timing “is being adjusted to accommodate the needs of the cod and
tanner crab fishermen,” according to agency commander Lt. Gen. Henry
Obering.

The Gulf of Alaska cod season began Jan. 1 and is likely to close by
mid-February, according to AP. The tanner crab season could last until March
31, though none are presently being caught due to a dispute between
fishermen and processors (Associated Press/Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Jan.
31).

A follow-up to an earlier post: After a round of stinging criticism over leaked draft budget documents for FY2006, the Bush administration has stepped back from cutting the budget of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In fact, now the administration says it is going to increase its funding.

The CTR program has been highly successful in securing dangerous nuclear material, helping Russia dismantle its Cold War nuclear infrastructure, and preventing the "brain drain" of former Soviet military nuclear scientists--all crucial nonproliferation efforts.

Kudos to the administration for this reevaluation. Could it be a sign of new self-reflection on the part of the Bush administration and an unbeknownst willingness to change course upon second reflection? Let's see what the final budget holds in February: will they also give up on their pursuit of new nuclear weapons R&D funding?

Sure It's Semantics, But Is It Torture?

Remember when the president's critics and the international press went to town over the convoluted, legalistic language surrounding that unforgettable answer: "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is."? Well, he ain't got nuthin' on ol' GW and his associates.

Today Alberto Gonzales is testifying before the U.S. Senate's Judiciary Committee in confirmation hearings that will likely propel him into the position of U.S. Attorney General. Online headlines, giving the blow-by-blow coverage, exclaim "Gonzales Disavows Torture" (NY Times), seemingly as a consolation to Gonzales' critics, who worry that his previous writings on the matter could be construed as endorsing torture as an interrogation method in the war against terrorism and as dismissing the relevance of the Geneva Conventions. So now that he's disavowed torture, we can all sleep soundly, knowing that if we say we not going to torture, then we won't. Right?

Wrong. Unfortunately, it seems that for Gonzales, what is torture is not "torture." Therefore, it's meaningless to ask, as Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Arlen Specter did today, whether Gonzales approves of torture--and in fact, it's actually harmful, because it leads to a wrong conclusion. Gonzales can answer with a straight face "No" and yet in the same breath defend the prisoner treatment at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay and the transporting of prisoners for interrogation to states that actively do condone torture (and who knows what other horrors that may still come to light). That's because he defines "torture" in the most narrow, most constricted, most legalistic manner possible. And if he can't undefine torture, then he'll run to the other end of the looking glass and undefine the tortured, arguing that the people captured in the war on terrorism don't deserve the same rights as any others captured in any other war, because this war is not like any other war.

This is just the latest example of how this administration puts Clinton's legalistic acrobatics to shame ("It depends on how you define 'alone.'") And after four years, they've learned well how to apply semantics to other issues in addition to torture:

Nonproliferation
During the 2004 presidential campaign, the one issue that President Bush and Senator Kerry (famously) agreed on was that the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction was the most important issue facing our country today. It was a point of high theater during the debates and elsewhere: that even if we are so bitterly divided on other issues, when it comes to national security, we stand side by side as Americans.

However, in the first indication of the administration's priorities after the elections, drafts of the 2006 presidential budget are beginning to leak out, and as it currently stands, the Bush administration is actually cutting $46 million from the main program that works to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction--the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This represents nearly 10% of its budget at a time when many argue that its budget needs to be substantially increased and additional political weight thrown behind the program, rather than retreating from it. How's that for following through with political rhetoric?

Missile Defense
The first Bush campaign back in 2000 promised that President Bush would deploy missile defenses by the end of his first term. With the 2nd term fast approaching, he hasn't quite gotten there yet, but he's breaking down facts and reality-based inconveniences to do so in the very near future. The necessary components won't be in place for years, if not decades (former Pentagon acquisition overseer Phil Coyle has likened it to trying to fly a plane without the wings or tail) and the few initial pieces which do exist have high failure rates in the few tests that have actually been conducted (the last occuring just last month). Yet in an act of breathtaking defiance of reality, soon the missile defense system will be called "operational" or "deployed" or a "contingent capability" or some other phrase that sounds like it's ready to shoot down whatever they (whoever they are) throw at us. Who needs proof when you have creative Pentagon linguists?

War-Fighting Strategy
It's an oldie but a goodie. The Bush administration has advocated "pre-emption" as a cornerstone of its foreign policy--except that what they're really talking about is "prevention." No one argues with pre-emption as an accepted rationale for war. Pre-emption means that if we had seen the Japanese steaming toward Pearl Harbor on December 6th, 1941, we would have been within our rights and justified to attack the Japanese vessels in order to thwart their imminent attack, as an act of self-preservation.

But it's a different thing to say that we could have bombed Tokyo in 1935--because we were worried that one day they might want to harm us and have the ability to do so. No one would have found that justifiable. That is prevention, and it's a license to attack anyone at any time. And it's exactly what the Bush administration is arguing now, both in its war against Iraq and in its policy documents that give the setting within which the Bush administration works. And the Bush administration has counted on the fact that no one will really notice or bother with the difference between pre-emption and prevention and their use of the words. So far, they're right.

So to recount:
Torture is not "torture."
"Greatest threat" = slashing budgets
"Deployment" = the Emperor's New Clothes
"Pre-emption" erases the need to justify military action.

I have a few more phrases to suggest:
"Ignorance is strength."
"War is peace."

I'm sure a Gonzales Justice Department can work on those.

Strategeric Communication

To find credible voices that rebut some of the more egregious rhetoric coming out of the administration regarding our foreign policy, look no further than the Pentagon's own Defense Science Board, a group appointed by the Defense Department to give advice on policy. Their latest report "Strategic Communication" contains some interesting critiques on how the US needs to approach its foreign policy. Here are some key snippets:

"America's negative image in world opinion and dimininished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communication strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance." [In other words, it's not always what we say, it's what we do. Not everyone opposes us just because they hate our freedom or our way of life.]

"[T]hrough evaluation and feedback, it [strategic communication] will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statescraft." [It is wise to be attentive and adaptive, willing to change course and approach when prudent.]

"Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not
increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards." [It's tough to improve on that.]

But then when it gets to recommendations, things get strange:

"The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create
legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for
Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations
represented on its Strategic Communication Committee." [Is an independent, non-partisan thinktank possible in the realm of reshaping communication?]

"The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should
act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s
principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee." [The current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is Douglas Feith, whose office has largely been regarded as responsible for the manipulation of intelligence and for manufacturing the need for war in Iraq. Surely, we don't want this individual in charge of strategic intelligence?]

It seems like the Defense Science Board wants to have it both ways. First, it makes clear statements that policy must be based on an understanding of interests, needs, histories, perceptions, and a host of other factors--pointedly not double-standard rhetoric from those without credibility. But then in the next breath, it recommends not changes in policy, but changes in our strategic communication structures.

Maybe that disjunction can be the first analysis project of the new independent, non-partisan strategic communication think tank. And maybe Doug Feith can author the report.

A Fair Weather Friend

The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency has been trying to conduct a flight test of its ground-based missile defense system, set to be placed "on alert" and officially "deployed" any day now. It's a good thing they're doing the test--as it's the first flight test in 2 years.

But for 3 days now, the MDA has prepared to do the test, set everything up, and scrapped it at the last minute. The reason? Stormy weather. What kind of stormy weather? Hurricanes? Tornados? Tsunamis? Um, no. Not even RAIN. "It is just heavy cloud cover,'' said Rick Lehner, MDA spokesperson, according to an AP report.

The multi-billion dollar project that is supposed to locate, track, and intercept an oncoming warhead in the coldness of space with a counter-EKV (exoatmospheric kill vehicle) of its own, with the assistance of a dizzying array of radars, sensors, satellites, trans-continental communications hookups and a command center located at the heart of our strategic military command center (STRATCOM), apparently doesn't test well when the weather is less than a perfect Southern California summer afternoon.

It makes me long for the days of B-2 stealth bombers whose stealth coating came off in the rain and so had to live in special hangers and only fly on nice days. Then again...maybe the same folks who used to work on the B-2 project now work on missile defense...it all starts to make sense...

For now, here's to hoping for good weather...and that no one who wants to shoot a missile at us can read the weather reports.

Problems with the OTHER Intelligence bill

It's not often that the leader of a Senate committee votes against the one authorizing bill that he has immediate juristiction of and oversight on. But that's exactly what Senator Rockefeller did yesterday, for reasons that are not entirely clear, but which from the tone of his and Senator Ron Wyden's statements, are worrisome.

Here's the statement by Senator John Rockefeller (D-WV) yesterday (Dec 8, 2004) on the Senate floor, talking about an undefined item in the FY05 Intelligence Authorization conference report bill that passed the Senate yesterday (not to be confused with the other intelligence bill also passed in the Senate yesterday). Conjecture is that the item in question is almost certainly satellite related, perhaps involving work on space-based interceptors.

SENATOR ROCKEFELLER: "Madam President, I will spend a minute on separate intelligence -related matter before speaking about the bill currently before the Senate. In the time I have been vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have worked hard to try to make sure that funds are channeled to where they ought to be in intelligence . For this reason, and with a great deal of reluctance, I am going to oppose the fiscal year 2005 intelligence authorization conference report, which the Senate will consider later today.

My decision to take this somewhat unprecedented action is based solely on my strenuous objection--shared by many in our committee--to a particular major funding acquisition program that I believe is totally unjustified and very wasteful and dangerous to national security.

Because of the highly classified nature of the programs contained in the national intelligence budget, I cannot talk about them on the floor. But the Senate has voted for the past 2 years to terminate the program of which I speak, only to be overruled in the appropriations conference . The intelligence authorization conference report that I expect to be before the Senate later today fully authorizes funding for this unjustified and stunningly expensive acquisition. I simply cannot overlook that.

My decision is shared by a number of my colleagues. Speaking for myself, if we are asked to fund this particular program next year, I will seriously consider and probably will ask the Senate to go into closed session so the Senators can understand, fully debate, become informed upon, and then vote on termination of this very wasteful acquisition program."

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) then stepped to the podium to make these supporting remarks:

SENATOR WYDEN: ". . .I, like the vice chairman, do not support the continued funding of a major acquisition program which is unnecessary, ineffective, over budget, and too expensive. . .I do not believe the continued funding of this program is the best way to secure our Nation and the safety of our troops and citizens. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has raised concerns about the need and costs of this program for the past 4 years and sought to cancel this program in each of the past 2 years. . .

The Senate Intelligence Committee has determined that this program should not be funded based on firm policy judgments. Numerous independent reviews have concluded that the program does not fulfill a major intelligence gap or shortfall, and the original justification for developing this technology has eroded in importance due to the changed practices and capabilities of our adversaries. There are a number of other programs in existence and in development whose capabilities can match those envisioned for this program at far less cost and technological risk. . .

I wish more of my colleagues knew of the details of this program and understood why we are so convinced that it should be canceled. I encourage you to request a briefing, to come to the Intelligence Committee and let our staff explain why we believe we are right about this program. If you do, I believe my colleagues would agree with the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and vote to stop this program next year."