Strategeric Communication

To find credible voices that rebut some of the more egregious rhetoric coming out of the administration regarding our foreign policy, look no further than the Pentagon's own Defense Science Board, a group appointed by the Defense Department to give advice on policy. Their latest report "Strategic Communication" contains some interesting critiques on how the US needs to approach its foreign policy. Here are some key snippets:

"America's negative image in world opinion and dimininished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communication strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance." [In other words, it's not always what we say, it's what we do. Not everyone opposes us just because they hate our freedom or our way of life.]

"[T]hrough evaluation and feedback, it [strategic communication] will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statescraft." [It is wise to be attentive and adaptive, willing to change course and approach when prudent.]

"Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not
increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards." [It's tough to improve on that.]

But then when it gets to recommendations, things get strange:

"The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create
legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for
Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations
represented on its Strategic Communication Committee." [Is an independent, non-partisan thinktank possible in the realm of reshaping communication?]

"The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should
act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s
principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee." [The current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is Douglas Feith, whose office has largely been regarded as responsible for the manipulation of intelligence and for manufacturing the need for war in Iraq. Surely, we don't want this individual in charge of strategic intelligence?]

It seems like the Defense Science Board wants to have it both ways. First, it makes clear statements that policy must be based on an understanding of interests, needs, histories, perceptions, and a host of other factors--pointedly not double-standard rhetoric from those without credibility. But then in the next breath, it recommends not changes in policy, but changes in our strategic communication structures.

Maybe that disjunction can be the first analysis project of the new independent, non-partisan strategic communication think tank. And maybe Doug Feith can author the report.

A Fair Weather Friend

The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency has been trying to conduct a flight test of its ground-based missile defense system, set to be placed "on alert" and officially "deployed" any day now. It's a good thing they're doing the test--as it's the first flight test in 2 years.

But for 3 days now, the MDA has prepared to do the test, set everything up, and scrapped it at the last minute. The reason? Stormy weather. What kind of stormy weather? Hurricanes? Tornados? Tsunamis? Um, no. Not even RAIN. "It is just heavy cloud cover,'' said Rick Lehner, MDA spokesperson, according to an AP report.

The multi-billion dollar project that is supposed to locate, track, and intercept an oncoming warhead in the coldness of space with a counter-EKV (exoatmospheric kill vehicle) of its own, with the assistance of a dizzying array of radars, sensors, satellites, trans-continental communications hookups and a command center located at the heart of our strategic military command center (STRATCOM), apparently doesn't test well when the weather is less than a perfect Southern California summer afternoon.

It makes me long for the days of B-2 stealth bombers whose stealth coating came off in the rain and so had to live in special hangers and only fly on nice days. Then again...maybe the same folks who used to work on the B-2 project now work on missile defense...it all starts to make sense...

For now, here's to hoping for good weather...and that no one who wants to shoot a missile at us can read the weather reports.

Problems with the OTHER Intelligence bill

It's not often that the leader of a Senate committee votes against the one authorizing bill that he has immediate juristiction of and oversight on. But that's exactly what Senator Rockefeller did yesterday, for reasons that are not entirely clear, but which from the tone of his and Senator Ron Wyden's statements, are worrisome.

Here's the statement by Senator John Rockefeller (D-WV) yesterday (Dec 8, 2004) on the Senate floor, talking about an undefined item in the FY05 Intelligence Authorization conference report bill that passed the Senate yesterday (not to be confused with the other intelligence bill also passed in the Senate yesterday). Conjecture is that the item in question is almost certainly satellite related, perhaps involving work on space-based interceptors.

SENATOR ROCKEFELLER: "Madam President, I will spend a minute on separate intelligence -related matter before speaking about the bill currently before the Senate. In the time I have been vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have worked hard to try to make sure that funds are channeled to where they ought to be in intelligence . For this reason, and with a great deal of reluctance, I am going to oppose the fiscal year 2005 intelligence authorization conference report, which the Senate will consider later today.

My decision to take this somewhat unprecedented action is based solely on my strenuous objection--shared by many in our committee--to a particular major funding acquisition program that I believe is totally unjustified and very wasteful and dangerous to national security.

Because of the highly classified nature of the programs contained in the national intelligence budget, I cannot talk about them on the floor. But the Senate has voted for the past 2 years to terminate the program of which I speak, only to be overruled in the appropriations conference . The intelligence authorization conference report that I expect to be before the Senate later today fully authorizes funding for this unjustified and stunningly expensive acquisition. I simply cannot overlook that.

My decision is shared by a number of my colleagues. Speaking for myself, if we are asked to fund this particular program next year, I will seriously consider and probably will ask the Senate to go into closed session so the Senators can understand, fully debate, become informed upon, and then vote on termination of this very wasteful acquisition program."

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) then stepped to the podium to make these supporting remarks:

SENATOR WYDEN: ". . .I, like the vice chairman, do not support the continued funding of a major acquisition program which is unnecessary, ineffective, over budget, and too expensive. . .I do not believe the continued funding of this program is the best way to secure our Nation and the safety of our troops and citizens. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has raised concerns about the need and costs of this program for the past 4 years and sought to cancel this program in each of the past 2 years. . .

The Senate Intelligence Committee has determined that this program should not be funded based on firm policy judgments. Numerous independent reviews have concluded that the program does not fulfill a major intelligence gap or shortfall, and the original justification for developing this technology has eroded in importance due to the changed practices and capabilities of our adversaries. There are a number of other programs in existence and in development whose capabilities can match those envisioned for this program at far less cost and technological risk. . .

I wish more of my colleagues knew of the details of this program and understood why we are so convinced that it should be canceled. I encourage you to request a briefing, to come to the Intelligence Committee and let our staff explain why we believe we are right about this program. If you do, I believe my colleagues would agree with the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and vote to stop this program next year."

"You Must Remember This...

...a test is just a test..."

Back in the good old days when men were men and songs were sung in smoky Casablanca piano bars, the Missile Defense Agency or the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, or whatever you wanted to call the Pentagon agency in charge of missile defense programs, used to conduct tests. Ok, not really. But they used to promise to conduct tests, and lots of 'em, of whatever system they were working on that year. Take a look at the current system--GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) that has been in the works for the last several years in Alaska, California, Nebraska, and elsewhere, and has been the darling program that the Bush administration has promised to deliver.

GMD (which, fancy that! is not a Bush invention at all but a carryover from the Clinton administration) was supposed to go through about 30 developmental intercept tests, before it went on to about 10 or so additional more rigorous tests--following which, with enough successes and reliability gained, the Pentagon would decide whether to field the system or not.

Several years ago, the Missile Defense Agency promised Congress and the American people that intercept tests would occur frequently and with more complexity--they thought the likelihood would be about 4 a year, or every 3 months, while adding aspects that make the test more realistic--a night-time launch, some simple decoys, different trajectories, different speeds, that sort of thing. But that's all pretty much gone by the boards.

The last intercept test was almost exactly 2 years ago--and it failed, bringing the success rate to 5 out of 8 attempts total. It's a far cry from the 30 tests originally envisioned.

Since then, the MDA has been busy trying to fix the various problems that existed or cropped up subsequently, tried to figure out management issues, and tried to deliver on the Bush promise of a deployed missile defense system by the end of his first term.

Now, after an extensive hiatus, during which the MDA has been touting its success in things like getting a Boeing 747 to fly, the Pentagon has announced that in the next several days, there will indeed be a test--a "fly-by" test, mind you, that is not to be confused with an intercept test. If it intercepts, that's all well and good, but it's not their intention (wink wink, nudge nudge).

Whatever the result, the MDA will be under tremendous pressure to declare the system operational, no matter how they couch it--"initial deployment," or "limited readiness," or whatever, regardless of whether the upcoming test intercepts, merely flies, or is cancelled.

No matter the outcome, MDA can't make up 22 missing intercept tests with one "fly-by" attempt, assuming that you even count their failures as successes. Even with a "success," the system still has a long way to go, all the while continuing to eat up around $10 billion a year.

The Pentagon has been working on national missile defenses for 30 years, with no deployed, effective system to show for it, and $150 billion down the drain. Yet 10 years after the end of the Cold War, their still singing that same ol' tune...

"..the fundamental things apply, as time goes by."

Here are the links to the CNN and Global Security Newswire stories that are reporting on the upcoming test.