Your BASIC Nuclear Weapons Policy Blog

The NPT RevCon in the Rearview Mirror

2005-06-07T14:03:00.000-05:00

I attended two weeks of the quinquennial nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in May at the UN in New York. Here are my thoughts following the disastrous failure of the conference to achieve any substantive progress, which have been published by Reaching Critical Will in their final "News in Review" NPT newsletter:

Seeing the RevCon in the Rearview Mirror

The 2005 NPT Review Conference is history. Like the prostrate pedestrian victim of a hit-and-run Hummer accident, for those of us along for the ride, the conference is only dimly visible through the kicked-up dust in the rearview mirror. But what can be seen is not pretty.

At the end of the Cold War, many expert observers wondered what direction the global body politic would go without the East-West/Communist-Capitalist construct. Some saw great opportunity in the resulting freedom of movement that powerful countries could exert in such a world; others saw the danger of chaos. Now almost fifteen years later, we are beginning to learn that both of these aspects are true. A US-led coalition of the willing can invade and overthrow governments without fear from the Eastern Bloc; North Korea can withdraw from the NPT to pursue its nuclear programs with relatively little resultant pressure from the fractured
international framework.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the epitome of this post-Cold War dilemma and the current state of affairs demands answers to two questions: do we believe in the value of an international community and what value do we place on international law? If we value the first, then overarching issues that cross state boundaries demand attention beyond narrow and minimalist understandings. If we value the second at all, we will move to strengthen the international framework with a firm knowledge that in doing so, we not only benefit the larger community, but ourselves as well.

And so we come to the 2005 RevCon. The original text of the NPT has its shortcomings. But as a negotiated agreement between States, this is so nearly a truism as to be an empty assertion. Indeed, the very purpose of the review conferences is to monitor the operation of the treaty and suggest improvements as necessary. In that light, it is no surprise that an array of States have submitted over fifty working papers that offer improvements to the treaty in this year's conference. What is unconscionable is that no progress was made at all on any suggestion, due to the hijacking of the process by a very few States - two to be exact: the United States and Iran.

Both sides contort their arguments to make their case, relying on a narrow reading of the NPT. Iran asserts its right to civilian nuclear power- and by extension, a complete fuel cycle while denying that any intention exists to create a domestic nuclear weapon capability. The United States demands tighter controls and stricter enforcement of non-compliance, while claiming that it itself is in full compliance with Article VI.

Stephen Rademaker, the head of the US delegation, likes to say- and says often- that people should read the text of Article VI to see how little is obligated on disarmament, concluding that under any reading, the US is compliant. However, this is only potentially true under the strictest of readings. What it crucially ignores are past commitments given by the US, particularly during the RevCons of 1995 and 2000, that go well beyond the original Art. VI text, without which there would be no NPT today. These commitments are well known: ratification of CTBT, negotiations on FMCT, irreversibility of reductions, negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, etc.-yet the US has followed through on none of them and instead investigates new generations of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, Iran pins its claims to its nuclear program on an equally constrictive reading of Art. IV, asserting that as long as it is in compliance with its other NPT obligations (relevant here are Art. II and III) it has the right to pursue a civilian program however it sees fit, i.e., a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle. This is also not without problems. First, Iran has only in the kindest sense been cooperative with the IAEA, the body that monitors compliance, and has been found violating its obligations in the past, raising widespread suspicions that Iran is insincere in its stated intentions. Second, alternatives to a domestic fuel cycle exist and are embraced by many other Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Indeed, several suggestions for improving options for access to nuclear fuel by NNWS have been made over the last few months.

With this intransigence, inflexibility, and perhaps sleight-ofhand, two countries (and their proxies) hijacked the conference, preventing, for the first time ever, any of the three working parties to forward a substantive document to the chair. Inside the NPT, there will be no progress. Starkly, outside the NPT, events will unfold nevertheless. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty, with consequences yet to unfold. Iran and the EU-3 negotiate for a settlement. The Bush administration will pursue new nuclear weapons and construe its disarmament obligations as it sees fit. Three States-India, Pakistan, and Israel-remain outside the treaty. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and their materials around the globe remains the number one international security threat facing us all.

The end of the Cold War has brought the prospect of dramatically improved options and rights for many. But with rights come obligations. In the end, we must learn that overarching frameworks, both national and international, must circumscribe the enjoyed freedom of movement brought about by the end of the Cold War. The more we undermine these systems, we not only encourage others to do likewise, but perhaps more importantly, we hamper our abilities both to deal with problems when they arise and to encourage others to help us in our efforts. With the end of the 2005 RevCon, we have frittered away a valuable opportunity.

As we grow five years older in 2010, let's hope we grow a bit wiser, too.

Catching Crabs v. Missile Defense

2005-02-01T17:37:00.000-05:00

Henny penny, the sky is falling!

Whether it's WMDs in Iraq or the threat from terrorist missiles, Don Rumsfeld and his doomsayer posse are sure at their best presenting grim faces and dire predictions--whether it's the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that necessitates preemptively invading a foreign country, or the threat of rogue nations developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that forces through a missile defense system hobbled by decades of technical problems and spiraling funding levels (So that's what "spiral development" means!).

But you know what? We've concluded there were no WMD in Iraq prior to the 2002 invasion.

We've found no evidence of a nuclear weapons development program in Iraq past 1992.

And as of today's news, we have reassessed our chemical weapons threat assessment of pre-invasion Iraq, admitting they had no chemical weapons program after 1991.

Should we be so surprised if we now find out that the missile threat isn't quite the bogeyman we've been told it is?

Today, it seems as though the Alaska cod and crab season are more pressing than developing missile defense. That's quite a change of heart from the President Bush who pledged to deploy missile defenses by the end of his first term (that's still as "Mission Accomplished" as Iraq is), in large part by gutting the testing program because the threat was so urgent we could brook no delay.

Now that's a whale of a fishing expedition.

Here's the story from the Feb. 1 edition of the Global Security Newswire:

U.S. Missile Defense Test Schedule to Work Around Alaska Cod, Crab Season,
Official Says

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s next target test launch from the Kodiak
Launch Complex in Alaska is expected to be scheduled around cod and tanner
crab fishing season, the Associated Press reported yesterday (see GSN, Jan.
13).

Officials previously had said the next test would occur in mid-February, but
that timing “is being adjusted to accommodate the needs of the cod and
tanner crab fishermen,” according to agency commander Lt. Gen. Henry
Obering.

The Gulf of Alaska cod season began Jan. 1 and is likely to close by
mid-February, according to AP. The tanner crab season could last until March
31, though none are presently being caught due to a dispute between
fishermen and processors (Associated Press/Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Jan.
31).

2005-01-12T06:03:00.000-05:00

A follow-up to an earlier post: After a round of stinging criticism over leaked draft budget documents for FY2006, the Bush administration has stepped back from cutting the budget of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In fact, now the administration says it is going to increase its funding.

The CTR program has been highly successful in securing dangerous nuclear material, helping Russia dismantle its Cold War nuclear infrastructure, and preventing the "brain drain" of former Soviet military nuclear scientists--all crucial nonproliferation efforts.

Kudos to the administration for this reevaluation. Could it be a sign of new self-reflection on the part of the Bush administration and an unbeknownst willingness to change course upon second reflection? Let's see what the final budget holds in February: will they also give up on their pursuit of new nuclear weapons R&D funding?

Sure It's Semantics, But Is It Torture?

2005-01-06T15:08:00.000-05:00

Remember when the president's critics and the international press went to town over the convoluted, legalistic language surrounding that unforgettable answer: "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is."? Well, he ain't got nuthin' on ol' GW and his associates.

Today Alberto Gonzales is testifying before the U.S. Senate's Judiciary Committee in confirmation hearings that will likely propel him into the position of U.S. Attorney General. Online headlines, giving the blow-by-blow coverage, exclaim "Gonzales Disavows Torture" (NY Times), seemingly as a consolation to Gonzales' critics, who worry that his previous writings on the matter could be construed as endorsing torture as an interrogation method in the war against terrorism and as dismissing the relevance of the Geneva Conventions. So now that he's disavowed torture, we can all sleep soundly, knowing that if we say we not going to torture, then we won't. Right?

Wrong. Unfortunately, it seems that for Gonzales, what is torture is not "torture." Therefore, it's meaningless to ask, as Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Arlen Specter did today, whether Gonzales approves of torture--and in fact, it's actually harmful, because it leads to a wrong conclusion. Gonzales can answer with a straight face "No" and yet in the same breath defend the prisoner treatment at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay and the transporting of prisoners for interrogation to states that actively do condone torture (and who knows what other horrors that may still come to light). That's because he defines "torture" in the most narrow, most constricted, most legalistic manner possible. And if he can't undefine torture, then he'll run to the other end of the looking glass and undefine the tortured, arguing that the people captured in the war on terrorism don't deserve the same rights as any others captured in any other war, because this war is not like any other war.

This is just the latest example of how this administration puts Clinton's legalistic acrobatics to shame ("It depends on how you define 'alone.'") And after four years, they've learned well how to apply semantics to other issues in addition to torture:

Nonproliferation
During the 2004 presidential campaign, the one issue that President Bush and Senator Kerry (famously) agreed on was that the threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction was the most important issue facing our country today. It was a point of high theater during the debates and elsewhere: that even if we are so bitterly divided on other issues, when it comes to national security, we stand side by side as Americans.

However, in the first indication of the administration's priorities after the elections, drafts of the 2006 presidential budget are beginning to leak out, and as it currently stands, the Bush administration is actually cutting $46 million from the main program that works to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction--the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This represents nearly 10% of its budget at a time when many argue that its budget needs to be substantially increased and additional political weight thrown behind the program, rather than retreating from it. How's that for following through with political rhetoric?

Missile Defense
The first Bush campaign back in 2000 promised that President Bush would deploy missile defenses by the end of his first term. With the 2nd term fast approaching, he hasn't quite gotten there yet, but he's breaking down facts and reality-based inconveniences to do so in the very near future. The necessary components won't be in place for years, if not decades (former Pentagon acquisition overseer Phil Coyle has likened it to trying to fly a plane without the wings or tail) and the few initial pieces which do exist have high failure rates in the few tests that have actually been conducted (the last occuring just last month). Yet in an act of breathtaking defiance of reality, soon the missile defense system will be called "operational" or "deployed" or a "contingent capability" or some other phrase that sounds like it's ready to shoot down whatever they (whoever they are) throw at us. Who needs proof when you have creative Pentagon linguists?

War-Fighting Strategy
It's an oldie but a goodie. The Bush administration has advocated "pre-emption" as a cornerstone of its foreign policy--except that what they're really talking about is "prevention." No one argues with pre-emption as an accepted rationale for war. Pre-emption means that if we had seen the Japanese steaming toward Pearl Harbor on December 6th, 1941, we would have been within our rights and justified to attack the Japanese vessels in order to thwart their imminent attack, as an act of self-preservation.

But it's a different thing to say that we could have bombed Tokyo in 1935--because we were worried that one day they might want to harm us and have the ability to do so. No one would have found that justifiable. That is prevention, and it's a license to attack anyone at any time. And it's exactly what the Bush administration is arguing now, both in its war against Iraq and in its policy documents that give the setting within which the Bush administration works. And the Bush administration has counted on the fact that no one will really notice or bother with the difference between pre-emption and prevention and their use of the words. So far, they're right.

So to recount:
Torture is not "torture."
"Greatest threat" = slashing budgets
"Deployment" = the Emperor's New Clothes
"Pre-emption" erases the need to justify military action.

I have a few more phrases to suggest:
"Ignorance is strength."
"War is peace."

I'm sure a Gonzales Justice Department can work on those.

Strategeric Communication

2004-12-21T10:01:00.000-05:00

To find credible voices that rebut some of the more egregious rhetoric coming out of the administration regarding our foreign policy, look no further than the Pentagon's own Defense Science Board, a group appointed by the Defense Department to give advice on policy. Their latest report "Strategic Communication" contains some interesting critiques on how the US needs to approach its foreign policy. Here are some key snippets:

"America's negative image in world opinion and dimininished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communication strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance." [In other words, it's not always what we say, it's what we do. Not everyone opposes us just because they hate our freedom or our way of life.]

"[T]hrough evaluation and feedback, it [strategic communication] will enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statescraft." [It is wise to be attentive and adaptive, willing to change course and approach when prudent.]

"Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not
increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards." [It's tough to improve on that.]

But then when it gets to recommendations, things get strange:

"The Task Force recommends that the President work with Congress to create
legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center for
Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and organizations
represented on its Strategic Communication Committee." [Is an independent, non-partisan thinktank possible in the realm of reshaping communication?]

"The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should
act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the Department’s
principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating Committee." [The current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is Douglas Feith, whose office has largely been regarded as responsible for the manipulation of intelligence and for manufacturing the need for war in Iraq. Surely, we don't want this individual in charge of strategic intelligence?]

It seems like the Defense Science Board wants to have it both ways. First, it makes clear statements that policy must be based on an understanding of interests, needs, histories, perceptions, and a host of other factors--pointedly not double-standard rhetoric from those without credibility. But then in the next breath, it recommends not changes in policy, but changes in our strategic communication structures.

Maybe that disjunction can be the first analysis project of the new independent, non-partisan strategic communication think tank. And maybe Doug Feith can author the report.

A Fair Weather Friend

2004-12-10T16:21:00.000-05:00

The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency has been trying to conduct a flight test of its ground-based missile defense system, set to be placed "on alert" and officially "deployed" any day now. It's a good thing they're doing the test--as it's the first flight test in 2 years.

But for 3 days now, the MDA has prepared to do the test, set everything up, and scrapped it at the last minute. The reason? Stormy weather. What kind of stormy weather? Hurricanes? Tornados? Tsunamis? Um, no. Not even RAIN. "It is just heavy cloud cover,'' said Rick Lehner, MDA spokesperson, according to an AP report.

The multi-billion dollar project that is supposed to locate, track, and intercept an oncoming warhead in the coldness of space with a counter-EKV (exoatmospheric kill vehicle) of its own, with the assistance of a dizzying array of radars, sensors, satellites, trans-continental communications hookups and a command center located at the heart of our strategic military command center (STRATCOM), apparently doesn't test well when the weather is less than a perfect Southern California summer afternoon.

It makes me long for the days of B-2 stealth bombers whose stealth coating came off in the rain and so had to live in special hangers and only fly on nice days. Then again...maybe the same folks who used to work on the B-2 project now work on missile defense...it all starts to make sense...

For now, here's to hoping for good weather...and that no one who wants to shoot a missile at us can read the weather reports.

Problems with the OTHER Intelligence bill

2004-12-09T10:32:00.000-05:00

It's not often that the leader of a Senate committee votes against the one authorizing bill that he has immediate juristiction of and oversight on. But that's exactly what Senator Rockefeller did yesterday, for reasons that are not entirely clear, but which from the tone of his and Senator Ron Wyden's statements, are worrisome.

Here's the statement by Senator John Rockefeller (D-WV) yesterday (Dec 8, 2004) on the Senate floor, talking about an undefined item in the FY05 Intelligence Authorization conference report bill that passed the Senate yesterday (not to be confused with the other intelligence bill also passed in the Senate yesterday). Conjecture is that the item in question is almost certainly satellite related, perhaps involving work on space-based interceptors.

SENATOR ROCKEFELLER: "Madam President, I will spend a minute on separate intelligence -related matter before speaking about the bill currently before the Senate. In the time I have been vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have worked hard to try to make sure that funds are channeled to where they ought to be in intelligence . For this reason, and with a great deal of reluctance, I am going to oppose the fiscal year 2005 intelligence authorization conference report, which the Senate will consider later today.

My decision to take this somewhat unprecedented action is based solely on my strenuous objection--shared by many in our committee--to a particular major funding acquisition program that I believe is totally unjustified and very wasteful and dangerous to national security.

Because of the highly classified nature of the programs contained in the national intelligence budget, I cannot talk about them on the floor. But the Senate has voted for the past 2 years to terminate the program of which I speak, only to be overruled in the appropriations conference . The intelligence authorization conference report that I expect to be before the Senate later today fully authorizes funding for this unjustified and stunningly expensive acquisition. I simply cannot overlook that.

My decision is shared by a number of my colleagues. Speaking for myself, if we are asked to fund this particular program next year, I will seriously consider and probably will ask the Senate to go into closed session so the Senators can understand, fully debate, become informed upon, and then vote on termination of this very wasteful acquisition program."

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) then stepped to the podium to make these supporting remarks:

SENATOR WYDEN: ". . .I, like the vice chairman, do not support the continued funding of a major acquisition program which is unnecessary, ineffective, over budget, and too expensive. . .I do not believe the continued funding of this program is the best way to secure our Nation and the safety of our troops and citizens. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has raised concerns about the need and costs of this program for the past 4 years and sought to cancel this program in each of the past 2 years. . .

The Senate Intelligence Committee has determined that this program should not be funded based on firm policy judgments. Numerous independent reviews have concluded that the program does not fulfill a major intelligence gap or shortfall, and the original justification for developing this technology has eroded in importance due to the changed practices and capabilities of our adversaries. There are a number of other programs in existence and in development whose capabilities can match those envisioned for this program at far less cost and technological risk. . .

I wish more of my colleagues knew of the details of this program and understood why we are so convinced that it should be canceled. I encourage you to request a briefing, to come to the Intelligence Committee and let our staff explain why we believe we are right about this program. If you do, I believe my colleagues would agree with the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and vote to stop this program next year."

"You Must Remember This...

2004-12-08T14:47:00.000-05:00

...a test is just a test..."

Back in the good old days when men were men and songs were sung in smoky Casablanca piano bars, the Missile Defense Agency or the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, or whatever you wanted to call the Pentagon agency in charge of missile defense programs, used to conduct tests. Ok, not really. But they used to promise to conduct tests, and lots of 'em, of whatever system they were working on that year. Take a look at the current system--GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) that has been in the works for the last several years in Alaska, California, Nebraska, and elsewhere, and has been the darling program that the Bush administration has promised to deliver.

GMD (which, fancy that! is not a Bush invention at all but a carryover from the Clinton administration) was supposed to go through about 30 developmental intercept tests, before it went on to about 10 or so additional more rigorous tests--following which, with enough successes and reliability gained, the Pentagon would decide whether to field the system or not.

Several years ago, the Missile Defense Agency promised Congress and the American people that intercept tests would occur frequently and with more complexity--they thought the likelihood would be about 4 a year, or every 3 months, while adding aspects that make the test more realistic--a night-time launch, some simple decoys, different trajectories, different speeds, that sort of thing. But that's all pretty much gone by the boards.

The last intercept test was almost exactly 2 years ago--and it failed, bringing the success rate to 5 out of 8 attempts total. It's a far cry from the 30 tests originally envisioned.

Since then, the MDA has been busy trying to fix the various problems that existed or cropped up subsequently, tried to figure out management issues, and tried to deliver on the Bush promise of a deployed missile defense system by the end of his first term.

Now, after an extensive hiatus, during which the MDA has been touting its success in things like getting a Boeing 747 to fly, the Pentagon has announced that in the next several days, there will indeed be a test--a "fly-by" test, mind you, that is not to be confused with an intercept test. If it intercepts, that's all well and good, but it's not their intention (wink wink, nudge nudge).

Whatever the result, the MDA will be under tremendous pressure to declare the system operational, no matter how they couch it--"initial deployment," or "limited readiness," or whatever, regardless of whether the upcoming test intercepts, merely flies, or is cancelled.

No matter the outcome, MDA can't make up 22 missing intercept tests with one "fly-by" attempt, assuming that you even count their failures as successes. Even with a "success," the system still has a long way to go, all the while continuing to eat up around $10 billion a year.

The Pentagon has been working on national missile defenses for 30 years, with no deployed, effective system to show for it, and $150 billion down the drain. Yet 10 years after the end of the Cold War, their still singing that same ol' tune...

"..the fundamental things apply, as time goes by."

Here are the links to the CNN and Global Security Newswire stories that are reporting on the upcoming test.

A Christmas Present for Thanksgiving

2004-11-24T13:30:00.000-05:00

Throughout its first term, while calling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the #1 security threat to the United States, the Bush administration has pushed hard to develop new and modified nuclear weapons, causing many in the international community to question US commitment to nonproliferation and giving dangerous regimes the political cover to advance their own nuclear programs. This year, the administration requested funding for a number of initiatives:

the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (a "bunker buster" weapon)
Advanced Concepts (R&D on new or modified weapons designs)
a Modern Pit Facility (to churn out, in Sorcerer's Apprentice fashion, thousands of new plutonium "pits" for nuclear weapons)
and Enhanced Test Readiness (to shorten the time needed to prepare for a nuclear test, if ordered).

Not that these requests are out of line for this administration, which over the last four years has formulated and put in place a number of dangerous precedents that keep the saliency of US nuclear weapons high:

the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review
the refusal to consider ratification of the CTBT
an emphasis on counterproliferation rather than disarmament
a preference for non-destructive and reversible agreements such as the Moscow Treaty
a widening of nuclear doctrine to consider nuclear strikes against non-nuclear targets

However, an interesting thing happened on the way to the bomb factory. Congress zeroed out all funding for new nukes. Let me say that again: the Republican-controlled Congress acted and chose to refuse to fund the Bush administration's requests for new nuclear weapons work. It's an astonishing act of independence and sanity.

By rebuking the Bush funding requests, Congress sends a clear message that nonproliferation, not a new arms race, is the path toward greater security. In all likelihood, President Bush will renew his funding requests next year, as the Bush administration does not easily admit its mistakes. But even a Republican-controlled Congress swears no loyalty oath to President Bush
or his funding requests. And on the eve of Thanksgiving here in the United States, that, along with these spending cuts, is something to be thankful for.

Here are the figures, for those of you keeping score:

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
Administration request: $27.6 million
Congressional funding: $0

Advanced Concepts
Admin request: $9 million
Congressional funding: $0
(shifted to "Reliable Replacement Warhead" program, a "program to improve the reliability, longevity and certifiability of existing weapons and their components.")

Modern Pit Facility
Admin request: $29 million
Congressional funding: $7 million
(and the Department of Energy was barred from using any funds to select a new construction site)

Enhanced test readiness
Admin request: $30 million
Congressional funding: $0

When your only tool is a hammer...

2004-11-16T09:26:00.000-05:00

Richard Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, former chair of the Defense Policy Board, and leading neo-conservative thinker advising the Bush administration had this to say last night on the News Hour with Jim Lehrer regarding Colin Powell's departure:

"It was his fate to be the nation's top diplomat at a time when some of the urgent problems we faced could not be dealt with by diplomatic means."

Let's see, what were some of those urgent problems?

Iraq? No, it turns out they had no weapons of mass destruction and that sanctions had been effective in containing Saddam.

Iran? Well, it seems the approach was to ignore the real nuclear program Iran has been working on for the last four years, which has only been ramped up since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

North Korea? See the comments on Iran directly above.

Darfur? Aha! THERE'S a place where there's been all talk and no action. So this is what Perle's referring to...

So what does this mean for the presumptive Powell replacement, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, and her role for the next four years? Maybe she should start scheduling her tee times now.

Speaking of Dr. Rice, back before she was part of the Bush administration, she was, among other things, a board member of a DC international security think tank, the Henry L. Stimson Center, whose motto is "Taking pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives." Curiously, they seem a bit more nuanced than most of the Bush administration's foreign policies. Maybe while Dr. Rice is filling her dance card, she can ponder other options for US international security, should she ever have the opportunity to present them.

A special dinner for a special relationship

2004-11-11T16:31:00.000-05:00

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair is likely prepping for dinner with President George Bush at the White House as I type this blog entry. I will assume, safely I'll guess, that Mr. Blair will not have the chance to peruse this BASIC blog before he's off for an all-American feast. But aside from Iraq and the Middle East peace process--which understandably has center stage with the death of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat--here are some issues I would like to be discussed between the two leaders, particularly impacting the US-UK "special relationship."

Iran
The United Kingdom has been negotiating, along with France and Germany, a deal to convince Iran that pursuing an indigenous nuclear program is not in its interests. All sides are posturing, with Iran threatening to pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Europeans claiming a deal is nearly reached, and the United States considering bringing the issue to the UN Security Council regardless of what happens. November 25th, in just a few short weeks, is D-Day (or I-Day?), when the IAEA meets to decide the progress of Iran, whether it is meeting its nonproliferation obligations, and whether more stringent measures should be taken.

The U.K. pulls a lot of weight in this situation, and Mr. Blair has an opportunity to take the lead in a difficult issue that has not received enough attention in the last four years. With options constrained on many sides, I hope that Mr. Blair will be willing to present options which are stringent, but fair.

Nuclear Weapons
Earlier this year, the US and UK updated an important but not often discussed document tying together the strategic interests of the United States and the United Kingdom: the US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement, as it is commonly called. Among other things, the MDA establishes close cooperation between the two countries on nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery issues. Dating back to 1958, this agreement looks all the more contentious now, when nuclear non-proliferation is the hot topic, the United States is accusing several other countries of not living up to their NPT commitments, and the US has gone to war under the guise of stopping WMD in Iraq. Moreover, as soon as next year, the UK could begin internal discussions on the future of their nuclear weapons, which now all reside on UK Trident submarines. Any upgrading and modernization will be done with US assistance, further demarking the line between the nuclear haves and have-nots. More information on the US-UK MDA can be found here.

Mr. Blair could take the upper hand and begin to discuss practical means by which nuclear weapons could take a reduced role in US-UK and US-NATO security strategy, rather than press for the continuance of a policy out of step with the security realities of the 21st century.

2005 NPT Review Conference
Next spring, the NPT Review Conference in New York will meet at a time when many believe the Treaty is under dire strain and in danger of collapse. The central debate has focused on whether all states are meeting their nonproliferation obligations on one hand, and whether the nuclear-weapon states (most notably the United States) is meeting its disarmament obligations on the other. Meanwhile, the set of outlying states grows, with no solutions in sight, as India, Pakistan, and Israel are known or assumed to have nuclear weapons arsenals yet remain outside of the NPT, and other states such as Iran, North Korea, and Brazil skirt around the permissable edges. Whether the NPT can withstand the forces that threaten to pull it apart or at least render it dead in the water remains very much to be seen.

Mr. Blair again has the opportunity to bridge the gap between the US stance and that of nearly every other state in the NPT. While the UK has always been a staunch ally at the NPT conferences, there is no more pressing time to assert the leverage gained by being that staunch ally than now.

Missile Defense
The UK has already signed agreements with the US allowing the radars in North Yorkshire, UK, at Fylingdales AFB to be upgraded, for use in the US missile defense system now being "deployed" with interceptors in Alaska and California. The Fylingdales radars are seen as a critical part of the eyes of the system when it is expanded--potentially in the near future--to have added potential capability against Middle East ballistic missile launches (i.e., from Iran).

More contentious, though, is the recent revelation that, along with agreements on radar sites (also including the nearby Menwith Hill), the US and UK signed agreements that would open the door to basing missile interceptors on UK soil. This would be a major strategic advancement in US missile defense efforts, and one which has not received adequate attention, debate, or vetting on either side of the Atlantic. Mr. Blair should express caution on the speed and steps of this potential undertaking, and ensure that a full and thorough conversation can be held on the topic, within the US Congress and UK Parliament, as well as among the public constituencies.

It's natural that President Bush's first meeting after the election should be with our close ally Mr. Blair. And it's natural for them to focus on the topics staring them in the eyes--Iraq and the death of Mr. Arafat. But these other issues will push themselves to the fore whether the US and UK are ready for them or not sooner rather than later, and they will not wait another four years.

Better put on some strong coffee, it's going to be a late night.

Must the past be prologue?

2004-11-08T14:01:00.000-05:00

I can't believe it needs to be said again, but here goes:

1) Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction and did not pose a threat to the United States, its allies, or Iraq's neighbors prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, vilified and scorned by the US administration for his handling of IAEA inspections in Iraq and elsewhere around the globe, had this to say at a recent Stanford conference:

“It is true that the record and mode of behavior of [former Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein’s regime did not inspire much confidence; but it is also true that we had not seen any clear and present danger involving weapons of mass destruction, after months of intrusive inspection,” ElBaradei said.

2) The lesson of Iraq is that international sanctions and inspections worked.

Here's ElBaradei again: "The nuclear inspection process — while requiring time and patience — can be effective even when the country under inspection is providing less than active cooperation. When international inspectors are provided adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed by a credible compliance mechanism, and supported by international consensus, the verification system works.”

To look backwards, it is both easy and tragic to say that the US administration was wrong on its stated driving rationale for invading Iraq, which has led to the deaths--so far--of over 1,100 US military personnel and at least tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians, an ongoing insurgency more than a year after the "Mission Accomplished" photo op, and increased hatred and determination on the part of terrorist organizations throughout the world.

But does looking forward seem any better?

Iran is facing a showdown with the international community, which is likely to come to a head during the IAEA Board of Directors meeting starting later this month on the 27th. While elBaradei continues to exhort Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions of a complete fuel cycle, Britain, France, and Germany are working with Iran to come to an agreement ahead of the IAEA meeting. But the US administration is doubtful, regardless of what the IAEA advises, and is likely to push to have the matter taken up by the United Nations Security Council. However, regardless of US public opinion, it is the IAEA and elBaradei who have the cache of credibility and the US administration that must prove that it is not crying wolf--again.

(Many thanks to today's NTI's Global Security Newswire, from which I have cribbed ElBaradei's remarks.)

Now he tells us

2004-11-03T10:53:00.000-05:00

Thomas Christie, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Testing, who has always defended--sometimes staunchly--US missile defense plans, yesterday announced in a Bloomberg.com article by Tony Cappacio that the GMD (the ground-based midcourse defense system with its main interceptors based in Alaska) system must pass two flight tests in the next three months before it's deemed reliable.

This comes after months, if not years, of critics, both in and out of government stating over and over that the path the Pentagon has taken has eschewed rigorous testing and replaced it with a faith-based approach. The last intercept test occured a week before President Bush announced the deployment decision back in 2002. And it failed. Since then, there have been zero intercept tests.

As recently as in Congressional testimony last year, Christie announced his confidence in the missile defense deployment decision and has shrugged off concerns over the decimated testing schedule, stating that he had high confidence in the effectiveness of the system. Now that it comes down to it, though, now--he wants proof.

What was Governor Bush's only foreign policy plank in his platform in 2000? Deploying missile defense.

After years of opportunities, when does President Bush's top missile defense overseer first announce any concerns over the deployment? Election day, 2004.

God bless America.

Nuclear Sword of Damocles

2004-08-03T15:17:00.000-05:00

"NAGASAKI -- The end of the Cold War didn't end the threat of nuclear annihilation. An increasing number of experts worry that the dangers posed by those weapons of mass destruction are increasing as the nuclear nonproliferation regime is increasingly stretched and frayed."

So says Brad Glosserman, director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, writing in The Japan Times today. It's a fitting quote for BASIC's first blog entry. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) has been advocating for nuclear weapons nonproliferation and sensible international security proposals for sixteen years, by publishing research and analysis first on old-fashioned paper, then on our website and email lists. Now we're entering the blogging era.

On Your BASIC Nuclear Weapons Policy Blog, we hope to point out interesting items you might otherwise miss, provide analysis that you might not otherwise hear, and put into context the dazzling array of disparate items that come flying across our screens and into our mailboxes each and every day.

We hope you'll join us.

Matt Martin