I attended two weeks of the quinquennial nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in May at the UN in New York. Here are my thoughts following the disastrous failure of the conference to achieve any substantive progress, which have been published by Reaching Critical Will in their final "News in Review" NPT newsletter:
Seeing the RevCon in the Rearview Mirror
The 2005 NPT Review Conference is history. Like the prostrate pedestrian victim of a hit-and-run Hummer accident, for those of us along for the ride, the conference is only dimly visible through the kicked-up dust in the rearview mirror. But what can be seen is not pretty.
At the end of the Cold War, many expert observers wondered what direction the global body politic would go without the East-West/Communist-Capitalist construct. Some saw great opportunity in the resulting freedom of movement that powerful countries could exert in such a world; others saw the danger of chaos. Now almost fifteen years later, we are beginning to learn that both of these aspects are true. A US-led coalition of the willing can invade and overthrow governments without fear from the Eastern Bloc; North Korea can withdraw from the NPT to pursue its nuclear programs with relatively little resultant pressure from the fractured international framework.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime is the epitome of this post-Cold War dilemma and the current state of affairs demands answers to two questions: do we believe in the value of an international community and what value do we place on international law? If we value the first, then overarching issues that cross state boundaries demand attention beyond narrow and minimalist understandings. If we value the second at all, we will move to strengthen the international framework with a firm knowledge that in doing so, we not only benefit the larger community, but ourselves as well.
And so we come to the 2005 RevCon. The original text of the NPT has its shortcomings. But as a negotiated agreement between States, this is so nearly a truism as to be an empty assertion. Indeed, the very purpose of the review conferences is to monitor the operation of the treaty and suggest improvements as necessary. In that light, it is no surprise that an array of States have submitted over fifty working papers that offer improvements to the treaty in this year's conference. What is unconscionable is that no progress was made at all on any suggestion, due to the hijacking of the process by a very few States - two to be exact: the United States and Iran.
Both sides contort their arguments to make their case, relying on a narrow reading of the NPT. Iran asserts its right to civilian nuclear power- and by extension, a complete fuel cycle while denying that any intention exists to create a domestic nuclear weapon capability. The United States demands tighter controls and stricter enforcement of non-compliance, while claiming that it itself is in full compliance with Article VI.
Stephen Rademaker, the head of the US delegation, likes to say- and says often- that people should read the text of Article VI to see how little is obligated on disarmament, concluding that under any reading, the US is compliant. However, this is only potentially true under the strictest of readings. What it crucially ignores are past commitments given by the US, particularly during the RevCons of 1995 and 2000, that go well beyond the original Art. VI text, without which there would be no NPT today. These commitments are well known: ratification of CTBT, negotiations on FMCT, irreversibility of reductions, negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, etc.-yet the US has followed through on none of them and instead investigates new generations of nuclear weapons.
Similarly, Iran pins its claims to its nuclear program on an equally constrictive reading of Art. IV, asserting that as long as it is in compliance with its other NPT obligations (relevant here are Art. II and III) it has the right to pursue a civilian program however it sees fit, i.e., a complete domestic nuclear fuel cycle. This is also not without problems. First, Iran has only in the kindest sense been cooperative with the IAEA, the body that monitors compliance, and has been found violating its obligations in the past, raising widespread suspicions that Iran is insincere in its stated intentions. Second, alternatives to a domestic fuel cycle exist and are embraced by many other Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). Indeed, several suggestions for improving options for access to nuclear fuel by NNWS have been made over the last few months.
With this intransigence, inflexibility, and perhaps sleight-ofhand, two countries (and their proxies) hijacked the conference, preventing, for the first time ever, any of the three working parties to forward a substantive document to the chair. Inside the NPT, there will be no progress. Starkly, outside the NPT, events will unfold nevertheless. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty, with consequences yet to unfold. Iran and the EU-3 negotiate for a settlement. The Bush administration will pursue new nuclear weapons and construe its disarmament obligations as it sees fit. Three States-India, Pakistan, and Israel-remain outside the treaty. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and their materials around the globe remains the number one international security threat facing us all.
The end of the Cold War has brought the prospect of dramatically improved options and rights for many. But with rights come obligations. In the end, we must learn that overarching frameworks, both national and international, must circumscribe the enjoyed freedom of movement brought about by the end of the Cold War. The more we undermine these systems, we not only encourage others to do likewise, but perhaps more importantly, we hamper our abilities both to deal with problems when they arise and to encourage others to help us in our efforts. With the end of the 2005 RevCon, we have frittered away a valuable opportunity.
As we grow five years older in 2010, let's hope we grow a bit wiser, too.
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